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Charles de Gaulle: a Life of 
Consequence
De Gaulle. Julian Jackson. Cambridge: The 
Belknap Press of Harvard University Press, 2018. 
Pp. xl and 887. ISBN 9780674987210. Published 
in the United Kingdom as A Certain Idea of 
France: The Life of Charles de Gaulle. 
In France today, Charles de Gaulle is ev-
erywhere. At a recent count, more than 3600 
localities in France have a public space—street, 
avenue, square, roundabout—named after him. 
His statue is prominent in Paris and elsewhere. 
The official photo of Emmanuel Macron, the 
current French president, shows him in front of 
an open book, Charles de Gaulle’s War Memoirs. 
Reminders of de Gaulle and his impact upon the 
French people remain palpable in all of France.
Dr. Jack Van Der Slik is Professor Emeritus of Political 
Studies and Public Affairs, University of Illinois-
Springfield.
Most readers of this review are, like me, cap-
tives of the English language. My generation and 
those who are younger know about World War 
II and its consequences from countless renditions 
about it in the English language. I and others 
like me are little informed by a sturdy literature 
in French about France and French perspectives 
on the politics and outcomes of that war. For 
these readers De Gaulle, both the book and the 
man, are best accessible in scholarly English from 
Julian Jackson, a distinguished professor of his-
tory at Queen Mary University of London. His 
profile on the university’s website (www.qmul.
ac.uk) says that beginning with a study of the 
1930s’ depression in France, and in all his sub-
sequent research, Jackson has focused on French 
politics following that time. De Gaulle represents 
a culmination of his productive scholarship.
My review essay focuses upon Charles de 
Gaulle’s remarkable political career and how he 
shaped and reshaped the political machinery 
of France. Paying close attention to Jackson’s 
rendition and analysis, I will forgo discussing 
his careful recounting of de Gaulle’s handling 
of policy change for France regarding NATO, 
the European Economic Community or rela-
tionships with the Soviet Union, the People’s 
Republic of China, the United Kingdom, and the 
United States. Although not beyond the scope of 
Jackson’s rich engagement with de Gaulle, my fo-
cus is upon the political processes through which 
de Gaulle managed to gather, manipulate, and 
exercise unifying resources for leadership in a fac-
tionalized nation.
De Gaulle’s life history is a difficult challenge 
by Jack Van Der Slik
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to summarize briefly. Jackson’s book approaches 
a thousand pages. Wikipedia provides a lengthy 
article of 63 printed pages on de Gaulle. Let me 
set forth some of the essentials. Born in 1890, de 
Gaulle grew up in an upper middle-class family, 
the third of five children, in a devout Catholic 
household. His father was a professor of history at 
a Jesuit college. Charles received a military school 
education and quickly rose to be a company com-
mander in the French army during World War I. 
He was captured by the Germans in March 1916 
and held as a prisoner for 32 months. After the 
war he remained an army officer under Marshal 
Philippe Petain during the 1920s and held a staff 
position interfacing between military planning 
and civil government during the 1930s. In 1937 
he received command of a tank regiment. In 1940 
he saw action as a division commander, and he led 
his tanks in forcing a brief withdrawal by oncom-
ing German forces. He was promoted to brigadier 
general in June 1940, a rank he claimed for the 
rest of his life. In the middle of tempestuous gov-
ernment changes, de Gaulle was appointed min-
ister for “Defense and War” by Paul Reynaud, 
who briefly became prime minister of France on 
June 5. In mid-June de Gaulle was on a mission to 
London while the government in Paris disintegrat-
ed. Thereafter Reynaud resigned, and Petain be-
came prime minister and sought an armistice with 
Nazi Germany that was signed on June 21, 1940. 
The surrendering French government, headed by 
Petain, established itself in the small French city of 
Vichy. There, a fragment of the French parliament 
authorized a new constitution, dissolved itself, and 
allowed Petain to exercise full executive powers 
in behalf of the nation. From then until the war’s 
end, de Gaulle was the self-proclaimed head of the 
“Free French” and settled in London. By agree-
ment with the BBC, de Gaulle denounced the ar-
mistice on behalf of the Free French. On June 28, 
de Gaulle was recognized as the leader of the Free 
French by Winston Churchill’s administration, 
and London became the European headquarters 
of the Free French movement. 
During World War II, Roosevelt and Churchill 
had prickly interactions with de Gaulle. However, 
the Allied military under Eisenhower established 
cooperative agreements with the French military 
in North Africa. Eisenhower oversaw the North 
African invasion and made peace with the com-
mander of the French forces, Admiral Francois 
Darlan. Darlan successfully ordered all the French 
forces to lay down arms in return for Vichy control 
over the civilian governments in the French colo-
nies. After Darlan’s death at the hands of a French 
monarchist, the North African French accommo-
dated to Eisenhower, De Gaulle famously shook 
hands with Darlan’s successor, General Henri 
Gerard, and the French military joined the Africa 
campaign against the Germans. Subsequently, 
when Eisenhower led the Normandy invasion 
of Europe, the United States equipped French 
forces that were organized for a coordinating in-
vasion of southern France. De Gaulle became 
the accepted leader of the French Committee of 
National Liberation. After successful invasions, in 
late August 1944 Paris was liberated, the German 
forces withdrew from the city, and Eisenhower, as 
the Allied Supreme Commander, put his French 
divisions in the vanguard for the liberation of 
Paris. Promptly on the scene, De Gaulle relit the 
flame at the tomb of the unknown soldier at the 
Arc de Triomphe, on August 26,  for millions of 
liberated Parisians.
Jackson elucidates how de Gaulle captured 
control of both Paris and the nation. De Gaulle 
came before a body of resistance leaders (Consul 
National de la Resistance, or CNR) and there 
launched into an emotional speech: “Paris! Paris 
outraged! Paris broken! Paris martyred! [Long 
pause] –  but Paris liberated! Liberated by itself, 
liberated by its people with the help of the armies 
of France, with the help and assistance of the 
whole of France, of that France which fights, of the 
only France, of the true France, of eternal France” 
(326).
Jackson immediately comments on de 
Gaulle’s words: “What is striking about the rest 
of the speech, after this stirring opening, was the 
deliberate absence of any reference either to the 
Allies or to those resisters (some of them present) 
who had risked their lives so that they could live 
this moment. After the speech, [de Gaulle was 
asked] if he would now declare that the Republic 
was restored. De Gaulle’s curt reply expressed 
the thought behind every action he had taken 
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Jackson elucidates how de 
Gaulle captured control of 
both Paris and the nation.
since arriving in Paris: ‘The Republic has never 
ceased to exist.... Vichy was always, and remains, 
null and void. I am President of the Republic” 
(326-327). After that, in a series of moves, de 
Gaulle consolidated his authority by proclaim-
ing the continuity of the Third French Republic 
and becoming the accepted leader of France, 
not only within the nation but in relation to the 
Allied leaders of the United States, the United 
Kingdom, and the Soviet Union. Recognition 
was accorded by the United States and Britain 
on October 23, 1944. On 
November 11, the anni-
versary of the World War I 
armistice, the French were 
admitted to the European 
Consultative Commission, 
tasked to discuss the status 
of Germany after the end of the war. However 
France was allowed no part in the Yalta and 
Potsdam conferences by the United States, the 
United Kingdom, and the Soviet Union.
In October 1945, after the war in Europe 
ended, the French electorate chose a Constituent 
Assembly that would draft a constitution for a 
Fourth French Republic. On November 13, it 
made de Gaulle the head of the government. 
That was a government destined for failure. The 
Assembly was divided with three major factions: 
the Communists with 158 seats, the Christian 
Democrats with 152 and the Socialists with 142. 
Despite nearly unanimous votes for de Gaulle as 
head of the government, policy wrangling was 
endless. By the end of December, “the delibera-
tions of the commission drafting the constitu-
tion, dominated by the Socialists, were heading 
in a direction which seemed to weaken executive 
power even more than in the Third Republic” 
(380). Ruefully contemplating the prospects 
ahead for governing, de Gaulle decided upon 
an abrupt resignation on January 20, 1946. This 
act of protest did not evoke appeals to de Gaulle 
from the factionalized Assembly to “return on his 
own terms.” Instead the Communists exulted: 
“We got rid of de Gaulle without frightening the 
population” (384).
During what might have been a permanent 
withdrawal by de Gaulle from the French political 
scene, the Fourth French Republic held sway from 
1946 to 1958. The French economy, capitalized in 
part by the United States Marshall Plan funding, 
grew, and its cities prospered. However, the gov-
ernment produced 21 different ruling administra-
tions over a bumpy 12- year history. De Gaulle 
contented himself in mostly quiet withdrawal, 
during which he wrote and published a three-
volume Memoir series (1940-42; 1942-44; 1944-
1946). As the government lost or gave up pieces 
of its empire in Asia and Africa, successive admin-
istrations could not resolve 
issues in French Algeria 
about governance as a part 
of France or independent 
from France. The French 
army in Algeria backed a 
movement to defeat separa-
tion. In the spring of 1958, after months of gov-
ernmental fluidity, President René Coty called 
upon de Gaulle to lead a deep reform of the French 
governing system. De Gaulle appeared before the 
parliament on June 1, “asking for full powers to 
govern by decree for six months, the suspension of 
parliament during that period and authorization 
for the government to draft a new constitution 
to be submitted by a referendum for popular ap-
proval. De Gaulle gave not the slightest indication 
of how he intended to use these powers and left as 
soon as he finished.” Following a six-hour debate, 
“the Chamber voted: de Gaulle was invested by 
329 to 224 votes” (471).
As the last prime minister of the Fourth 
Republic, de Gaulle had six months of unchecked 
power to undertake reforms. These “resulted not 
only in the drafting of a new constitution, the im-
plementation of a major financial plan and several 
new initiatives in foreign policy but also a legisla-
tive frenzy resulting in the promulgation of over 
300 ordinances covering the most eclectic range of 
subjects.... What made their rapid implementation 
possible were the unique conditions under which 
de Gaulle had six months of untrammeled power 
to govern without parliament” ( 484).
After a petite team of de Gaulle devotees were 
assigned to create a new constitution, De Gaulle 
personally chaired a small ministerial committee 
to refine the draft. However, “Our only knowledge 
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of the debates [in the committee] comes from sub-
sequent recollections of the committee members” 
( 488). The discussion of revisions was dominated 
by de Gaulle, who “had a gift for suggestive ob-
scurity.” The new France would be a community, 
not a federation or confederation. In that commu-
nity, “All key areas of sovereignty—foreign-policy, 
defense, finance—remained with France; and the 
states retained the French flag and the national an-
them. The result was less than many African lead-
ers wanted” (490).
In the referendum that followed, there was 
huge participation and “yes” votes from 79 per 
cent of the metropolitan French voters. Numbers 
are not reported for Algeria and fourteen mem-
ber territories. When the new constitution went 
into effect on October 4, 1958, the Gaullists had 
the largest party, but not a majority, in the parlia-
ment. In December, de Gaulle was elected to a 
seven-year term of office by an electoral college 
of 80,000 voters created by the new constitution: 
“There were other candidates but de Gaulle’s 
election by 78 per cent of the electors was a fore-
gone conclusion” (505). The transfer of executive 
authority took place on January 8, 1959.
Despite de Gaulle’s rhetoric in Algeria in 
June 1958 that asserted Vive l’ Algerie francaise! 
(Long live French Algeria!), he advocated change 
in 1959 via self-determination. By referendum, 
Algerians could choose independence, integra-
tion with metropolitan France, or “the govern-
ment of Algeria by the Algerians, supported by 
the aid of France and in close union with her” 
(518). Change was opposed by the ethnic French 
in Algeria. In January 1960, in what is remem-
bered as Barricades Week, the ethnic French 
(pieds noirs) tried an insurgency that de Gaulle 
was able to quiet with a dramatic speech asking 
for unity. In June, de Gaulle successfully defused 
a challenge from the FLN (National Liberation 
Front), the nativist movement seeking complete 
Algerian independence. At the same time, “The 
French government revised its statutes of the 
Community to allow membership to be compat-
ible with independence. All France’s sub-Saharan 
African possessions had acquired independence 
by the end of July 1960” (525). Half a year later, 
“in the referendum on 8 January, 1961, some 75 
per cent of voters approved de Gaulle’s Algerian 
policy” (529), and De Gaulle’s designs for Algeria 
continued to evolve. At a press conference in 
April, de Gaulle spoke of “a solution by which 
Algeria would cease to belong to her [France]” 
(530). Briefly, there were fears that a military 
insurrection would reverse de Gaulle’s impera-
tive; but De Gaulle took to television to forbid 
the French army in Algeria from following their 
recalcitrant generals: “The effect of de Gaulle’s 
speech had been electrifying. The thousands of 
conscript soldiers who comprised the bulk of the 
army in Algeria listened on their transistor radi-
os.” Without support from the rank-and-file, the 
generals went into hiding: “The attempted coup 
was over” (532-533).
The rending of Algeria from France was not 
a neat and tidy process. What would be remem-
bered as the Evian talks began on May 20. They 
were briefly suspended in June, then resumed in 
July, when there were demonstrations and police 
violence. An attempt on de Gaulle’s life via a car 
bomb occurred in September, but secret negotia-
tions continued into the new year: “By the end, 
the French had abandoned almost every negoti-
ating position they had started with nine months 
earlier.... On the thorny issue of the rights of the 
Europeans, the compromise reached was that 
for three years the pieds noirs could hold double 
citizenship before deciding whether to become 
full Algerian citizens.... On March 18, [1962] de 
Gaulle announced the signing of the Evian ac-
cords on French television. In April, they were 
approved in a referendum by 91 per cent of those 
voting” (543). On July 1, more than 99 per cent 
of Algerians voted for their independence. Before 
the year ended an estimated 680,000 pieds noirs 
departed Algeria for France.
In a rather tart appraisal, Jackson character-
ized the Algerian resolution as less than a French 
and/or de Gaulle achievement:
De Gaulle’s “granting” of  Algerian indepen-
dence, while avoiding civil war in France, is of-
ten counted as one of  his greatest achievements. 
This judgement needs to be qualified. He did 
not “grant” independence: it was wrested from 
him. And he only partially avoided civil war.... 
De Gaulle’s caution could be explained by the 
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As the last prime minister of 
the Fourth Republic, de Gaulle 
had six months of unchecked 
power to undertake reforms.
need gradually to ‘sell’ the policy to the army 
and the French population, but if  anything the 
steady retreat, and the twists and turns of  policy, 
exacerbated the army’s sense of  betrayal.... [P]er-
haps no one could have done any better, but it is 
hard to see that anyone could have done much 
worse.... De Gaulle’s achievement, then, was less 
to have “granted” independence than to have 
persuaded people that that is what he had done; 
to make them believe that he had controlled the 
process; and to create a compelling narrative that 
explained France’s disengagement from Algeria 
and turned it into a victory 
rather than a defeat. (545)
It is Jackson’s sense that 
in the spring of 1962, de 
Gaulle, having proclaimed 
a resolution to the Algeria 
matter, “it seemed that 
‘normal’ politics might resume” (547), meaning 
that the old divisiveness in the parliament and 
challenges to de Gaulle’s exalted vision of France 
in international affairs would recur in French 
politics. In August a right-wing movement (OAS: 
Organization armee secrete) fostered an unsuc-
cessful assassination attempt upon de Gaulle and 
his wife. (For a somewhat fictionalized treatment 
in book and film, see The Day of the Jackal.) One 
of the assassins, an extreme right-wing anti-Gaul-
list, was executed. Noting the event as politically 
timely, de Gaulle “saw an opportunity to capital-
ize on the emotion aroused by the event to carry 
out a constitutional change he had been planning 
for some months” (558). What he wanted was a 
constitutional change to elect himself as president 
by universal suffrage. In a series of actions that 
overwhelmed his parliamentary opponents, de 
Gaulle called for a referendum and new elections 
to follow. De Gaulle got his way with 62 per cent 
support from the French voters. Parliamentary 
elections followed in November 1962: “[T]he 
Gaullists triumphed. For the first time in the his-
tory of French democratic politics, one party came 
within a few votes of an overall majority in parlia-
ment. The shortfall was easily made up by a few 
independent conservatives on the center right. The 
referendum and election put de Gaulle in a posi-
tion of complete political dominance....” (563).
Jackson is thorough and detailed about de 
Gaulle’s pursuit of grandeur in behalf of France. 
In 1960 France successfully tested a nuclear de-
vice at a Sahara site, making itself a peer with 
the United States, the Soviet Union, and Britain. 
In 1962 in an exchange of visits with Konrad 
Adenauer, “it was as if de Gaulle was granting 
Germany its absolution” for the historic wars of 
the two countries (584). In 1964 de Gaulle grant-
ed recognition to the People’s Republic of China 
despite the growing United States engagement in 
Vietnam. But sometimes de Gaulle overreached. 
In the Middle East crisis 
between Egypt and Israel, 
de Gaulle sought a four-
nations’ forum, including 
France, to bring about a 
settlement. Instead, the 
settlement was confirmed 
by agreement between the Soviet Union and the 
United States. Then President Lyndon Johnson 
scoffed: “the four Great Powers? Where the hell 
are the other two?” (685). In 1967, when de 
Gaulle visited Canada, he ignored the federal 
government in Ottawa. Focusing instead upon 
Québec and giving a major address in Montréal, 
he ended with  “Viva le Quebec libre, Viva le 
Canada francais, Vive la France” (687). Ottawa 
was offended, and De Gaulle canceled his visit to 
Ottawa and promptly flew back to Paris.
In May 1968, simmering issues in Parisian 
universities led to street riots, heavy-handed 
police violence, and solidarity strikes by trade 
unions, “and at its peak on 25 May there were 
several million workers on strike” (720). De 
Gaulle’s plan to call for a referendum to calm 
the storm was flatly rejected. In fact, “there was 
a cultural abyss between him and the protest-
ers, whose celebration of individualism, personal 
freedom and self-expression was the antithesis 
of his austere patriotism, in which individual-
ism was sublimated in the service of the nation” 
(725). But Georges Pompidou, the prime min-
ister, was able to nurture negotiations between 
labor and business leaders, who had seen enough 
of social unrest. On May 30, de Gaulle delivered 
a plan by radio that would dissolve parliament 
and call for parliamentary elections while blam-
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ing the Communists for the unrest:
The timing of  the speech was perfect. Public 
opinion had turned against the students; Pom-
pidou had held his nerve and found a way of  
negotiating a solution; the unions were keen 
to find a deal; plans for a Gaullist demonstra-
tion on May 30 were underway. The new ele-
ment was Pompidou’s idea of  dissolution, 
which meant that conservatives, traumatized by 
the disorder, were offered a chance to express 
themselves through the ballot box. For all these 
reasons, the crisis was probably close to a reso-
lution.” (735)
De Gaulle was once more rewarded by the 
electorate. Some major opponents were de-
feated: “[T]he Gaullist party...won 293 par-
liamentary seats, giving it a substantial overall 
majority, something never previously achieved 
by any single party in the history of French 
democracy” (737).
De Gaulle insisted upon going to the French 
electorate in 1969 with a referendum to restruc-
ture the French Senate: “[T]he idea was that in-
stead of being a second legislative chamber... the 
Senate would become a consultative body rep-
resentative of economic and social forces. This 
was an idea that had its roots in the corporatist 
thinking much in vogue in inter-war Europe.... 
[T]he proposed reform envisioned the creation of 
regional assemblies with powers of economic in-
vestment and infrastructure...” (748). Curiously, 
de Gaulle, after establishing a date for a referen-
dum, April 27, 1969, then began to doubt the 
prospects for its approval. In early April, anticipat-
ing defeat, de Gaulle decided upon his departure 
from office. It would be dramatic. In an April 25 
television address, de Gaulle announced that he 
would leave office if the referendum were not ap-
proved. By the evening of the 27th,  the no votes 
prevailed. At midnight a message was released, 
saying that the General would cease exercising 
his “functions as President of the Republic” on 
the very next day at noon. Promptly, de Gaulle 
departed from office and any further participa-
tion in the nation’s policy and political activities. 
Very quickly, de Gaulle put himself behind 
a curtain of privacy. In secrecy, de Gaulle and 
his wife departed to Ireland for a series of vis-
its to remote places. After a year of near ano-
nymity, he made a quiet retreat to his home in 
Colombey: “De Gaulle never set foot in Paris 
again, apart from an incognito visit for the first 
communion of his granddaughter Anne” (757). 
In private, he worked assiduously on a planned 
trilogy, Memories of Hope. Only the first volume 
was published in October 1970, a rendition of 
the years 1958 to 1962. After initial progress 
on the second volume, de Gaulle died from a 
ruptured aneurysm on November 9, 1970. The 
French people responded with an outpouring of 
grief. Jackson notes that thereafter “the de Gaulle 
myth assumed unstoppable proportions” (768). 
Celebrations of de Gaulle’s life were renewed in 
France in 1990 and 2010. Expressing his con-
cluding judgment about de Gaulle, Jackson said, 
“He saved the honour of France” ( 777).
Jackson is to be thanked and commended for 
the deep scrutiny he has provided about France 
and the French in the 20th century, in addition 
to his penetrating engagement with de Gaulle’s 
life. Jackson provides an unusual scholarly touch 
as an appendix to the book. There, Jackson de-
tails in thumbnail biographies more than 100 
contemporaries of de Gaulle who were significant 
to the era in which de Gaulle was the dominant 
figure. Jackson’s thorough documentation of the 
de Gaulle life fills 58 pages of footnote details. 
Often admiring of de Gaulle, he is not overawed. 
Frequently he characterizes the hero’s missteps, 
and he is candid about de Gaulle’s cruel disregard 
at times for those whose lives he wounded. With 
all, Jackson has given our 21st-century audience 
a rich account in English of a singular, towering 
figure prominent in World War II events who 
withstood the challenge of Communism by fos-
tering democracy in Europe thereafter. Those 
events and their outcomes significantly shaped 
today’s political world and the peace in which we 
presently live.
